1. Bad economics: the price tag has doubled to $600 million dollars. This wholly undermines the #1 argument for the choice of bus over rail in the first place, cost-effectiveness. With such outrageous costs, the busway will not only cost many times what rail would, but it will also attract fewer riders! (Pan Am has priced the Hartford-Waterbury connection at $52 million.)

2. Disadvantegous connections: the busway does not connect supply with demand–i.e., rich with poor, employers with employees, or retailers with shoppers. The busway travels from one distressed, shrinking city to an even more distressed, more rapidly shrinking one. It does not serve any of the economically vibrant areas nearby (e.g. West Hartford Center, Westfarms Mall.)

3. Lack of regional focus: One of the chief reasons why metro Hartford is falling behind other regions (e.g., Stamford, New Haven, Providence) is its lack of easy, reliable, and affordable transit links to larger, nearby metro regions (e.g. New York City and Boston, respectively.) Despite its high price tag, the busway will not connect Hartford to either of these regions. Indeed, it will not even tie Hartford to New Haven or Waterbury. The busway, which won’t even run 10 miles, is not a regional transportation solution; it is merely turbocharged local bus service. Rail, in contrast, could run from Bridgeport via Waterbury to Hartford, giving people a single-seat ride to the lucrative Fairfield County market (and only one change to continue to NYC.)

4. Public affinity for rail: the public tends to favor rail over buses. This is especially the case in Connecticut, where the track record for rail is good (see Metro-North) but bad for buses (see CT Transit’s multiple divisions as well as numerous, uncoordinated local transit districts.) The public’s high affinity for rail has been borne out by ridership that has far exceeded projections as rail lines have started up across the country, as well as the huge amount of transit-oriented development new rail service has instigated (see Portland, OR MAX and Streetcar; Portland, ME Downeaster.)

5. Delays and unending do-overs: the busway was supposed to be complete in 2006. Yet no ground has been broken or will be in the immediate future. The CT DOT has delayed the project repeatedly and engaged in an oblique series of studies, redesigning the project multiple times, at high cost, without providing explanation to the public or even other agencies concerned. The changes have been so significant that the findings of the original study that supported the busway no longer hold. In addition, some of those involved with the busway seem to view the project as “sacred,” taking umbrage at even at genuine questions and well-meaning suggestions for improvement. Such cult-like behavior has turned off many people to the busway and have led to doubts as to whether those behind the project are in touch with reality.

6. Cancelation of associated bus route improvements: the busway’s other main advantage (aside from its purported and now discredited low cost) was that, unlike rail, it could permeate into the community. Local buses could feed into the busway, removing the transfer that occurs when buses drop passengers off at the train station. It was envisioned that many buses, even local ones, would cover part of their routes along the busway. This has since been scrapped. The project’s latest service plans indicate that most local buses will NOT enter the busway but instead drop passengers off at busway stations, forcing a transfer. That is, the ride continuity advantage the busway had over rail is now GONE. This also means that the region’s problematic local bus routes will not be subject to the review and improvement that was promised.

7. Concerns about the success of the project: the above problems have led to doubts as to whether the project will actually succeed, i.e., whether it will meet ridership and development projections. Given the shaky economic climate, an project like the busway, though it might be exciting as an experiment in public transit, also seems a bit risky (at least in comparison with tried-and-true rail systems.) Given the busway’s enormously lengthy and expensive development, its failure could well turn taxpayers and politicians against future public transit projects, setting back transportation in Connecticut for an entire generation.

The right-of-way also has the potential to bring real passenger train service back to an area that hasn’t had it for years. The busway would essentially eliminate the possibility of rail to downtown New Britain.

There’s plenty of room for a busway in the right-of-way of I-84 and CT-9.